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This section 101 issue [on patentable subject matter] appears to have 
its foundation in a misunderstanding of patent policy, for the debate 
about patent eligibility under section 101 swirls about concern for the 
public’s right to study the scientific and technologic knowledge 
contained in patents. The premise of the debate is incorrect, for 
patented information is not barred from further study and 
experimentation in order to understand and build upon the knowledge 
disclosed in the patent. 
Judicial clarification is urgently needed to restore the understanding 
that patented knowledge is not barred from investigation and research. 
The debate involving section 101 would fade away, on clarification of 
the right to study and experiment with the knowledge disclosed in 
patents.1 
For nearly 200 years, the U.S. patent regime incorporated a defense 
allowing scientists to use patented inventions without authorization, so 
long as the purpose was for basic research. Over the last two decades, 
however, this defense, along with other public-regarding doctrines, has 
* Pauline Newman Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. The author was a member of the
National Academies Committees on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge Based Economy
and on Intellectual Property Rights in Genomic and Protein-Related Inventions, as well as the
Department of Health and Human Services Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health,
and Society. The reports of these committees are discussed below. She also signed the Banbury
Statement, likewise mentioned infra.
1. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Newman,
J., dissenting), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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been eviscerated. The repercussions are significant.2 In 2006, in a dissent 
from the denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer announced that in his view, 
patents could now “impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.’”3 Unsurprisingly, in a series of subsequent cases 
interpreting § 101 of the Patent Act,4 which sets out the core 
requirements of patentability, the Supreme Court restricted the 
availability of patents for fundamental scientific advances. In the life 
sciences, it held that natural phenomena and laws of nature must be 
freely available to all innovators and are not the appropriate subject 
matter for patent protection.5 In other areas, such as software, the Court 
emphasized the unpatentability of abstract ideas.6 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Supreme Court’s § 101 
jurisprudence is creating uncertainties that have a deleterious impact on 
business and innovation, particularly in the life sciences.7 While 
incentives to invent must now be discounted by the risk that 
nonpatentability will affect the profits of firms engaged in medical 
research, the patents that do issue can continue to exert substantial 
control over subsequent generations of innovators. As the quotation 
above from a dissenting opinion by Judge Pauline Newman suggests, 
however, the concerns about impeding research could be assuaged in a 
very different way. Instead of denying patents because of concerns that 
they will chill progress, the experimental use defense could be clarified 
so that it is clear that patent rights cannot impede upstream research. An 
2. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 457 (2004); Part I, infra. 
3. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari).  
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017). 
5. See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
(both in the life sciences). The Court has also raised the inventive step. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). The Federal Circuit has followed through by narrowing the scope of 
claims. See Ariad Pharms. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (2010) (written description); Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736-37 (2002), vacating 234 F.3d 
558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (doctrine of equivalents). 
6. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609-10 (2010) (business method); Alice v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355-56 (2014) (computerized business method). The Court has also raised 
the inventive step, KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418, and the Federal Circuit has followed through by 
narrowing the scope of claims, see Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d 1336 (written description); Festo 
Corp., 535 U.S. at 736-37. 
7. See, e.g., David Rodham & Brad Sheafe, Who Will Protect Life Sciences Innovation?, 
CORPCOUNSEL.COM (June 2016), available at http://dominionharbor.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/How-to-Protect-Life-Science-Innovations.pdf. Cf., Where Do We Stand 
One Year After Alice?, LAW 360 (June 17, 2015), available at http://www.law360.com/
articles/668773/where-do-we-stand-one-year-after-alice. 
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attempt along these lines was made in 2011 as part of the America 
Invents Act (the AIA).8 That effort failed, but another legislative 
package of patent reforms is likely to be introduced in the near future.9 
This Article, based on the Oldham Lecture at the University of Akron,10 
makes the case for including a statutory provision to protect a 
researcher’s ability to use patented inputs, a proposal that could be 
coupled with new language in § 101 that clarifies the availability of 
patents on fundamental scientific discoveries. 
My argument focuses on the field of life sciences, although similar 
issues may well exist in other fields where the output of basic science is 
closely associated with marketable products. The Article proceeds as 
follows. Part I traces the demise of the experimental use defense and 
then discusses the many significant changes that have occurred 
subsequent to the AIA’s failure to revive this defense legislatively. Part 
II argues that these changes militate in favor of a renewed effort to enact 
a research defense. Using European Union (EU) patent law as an 
example, this part compares the U.S. patent regime to the system in 
other developed countries and shows why the current situation could 
lead to research arbitrage, brain drain, and—ultimately—the loss of U.S. 
technological dominance. Part III discusses proposals to restore an 
experimental use defense. 
I. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE DEFENSE
A. The History
Until the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, a research defense
was securely enshrined in U.S. law. In two 1813 cases, Justice Joseph 
Story interpreted the Patent Act as distinguishing between uses of the 
patented invention “with an intent to . . . profit” and uses “for the mere 
purpose of philosophical experiment or to ascertain the verity and 
exactness of the specification.”11 As William Robinson summarized the 
8. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.). 
9. See, e.g., H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015-2016); Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent
Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, available at http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-
progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-reform-legislation/ (last visited _March 7, 
2017). 
10. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Pauline Newman Professor of Law at New York University School 
of Law and co-Director of its Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, The Albert & Vern 
Oldham 2016 Fall Lecture: Reconsidering Experimental Use (Nov. 4, 2016). 
11. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (Story, J.). See also Whittemore 
v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
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conclusion to be drawn from these cases: 
[W]here [the patented invention] is made or used as an experiment,
whether for the gratification of scientific tastes, or for curiosity, or for
amusement, the interests of the patentee are not antagonized, the sole
effect being of an intellectual character in the promotion of . . .
knowledge.
But if the products of the experiment are sold, or used for the 
convenience of the experimentor, or . . . with a view to the adaptation 
of the invention to the experimentor’s business, the acts of making or 
of use are violations of the rights of the inventor and infringements of 
his patent.12 
Justice Story’s carefully constructed exception began to crumble soon 
after the establishment of the Federal Circuit in 1982. 
At the time the Federal Circuit was established, efforts were being 
made to foster a generic drug industry with the hope that, after patent 
expiration or invalidation, the generics would sell medicines at lower 
prices than the originators charged and lower the cost of healthcare. In 
1983, one such generic firm, Bolar, decided to market the generic 
equivalent of Dalmane, a sleep disorder medication, as soon as the 
patent expired.13 To be ready at that time, Bolar conducted studies 
during the term of the patent to meet a preclearance requirement that it 
demonstrate to the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the 
bioequivalence of its formulation to the originator’s version.14 When 
Roche, the originator, sued for infringement, Bolar defended on the 
ground that its use was, if not exactly experimental in the Justice Story 
sense of the term, in the public’s interest nonetheless, and therefore 
should be exempt from infringement liability.15 The Federal Circuit 
disagreed. In Roche v. Bolar, it held that it is “the role of Congress to 
maximize public welfare through legislation.”16 Thus, the court declined 
to extend the experimental use exception to cover this rather clear 
commercial use.17 
Significantly, Congress quickly stepped in. In the Hatch Waxman 
Act of 1984,18 it provided originator firms with the opportunity to extend 
12. WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898 Vol. III
(1890). 
13. Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 865. 
16. Id.
17. Id. at 863. 
18. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc (2000) and 
4
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the term of their patents to cover delays caused by their own premarket 
clearance obligations.19 In exchange, the legislature created an exception 
to infringement liability: 
to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import 
into the United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information 
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of 
drugs or veterinary biological products.20 
But despite Congress’s embrace of room for experimentation in Hatch 
Waxman, in several subsequent cases the Federal Circuit further 
narrowed the exception, doubling (really, tripling) down on Bolar. 
In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., the court held that an 
academic scientist, in trying to find a cheap and effective way to design 
around a patent for a method for inoculating chicks in ovo against 
disease, infringed the patent.21  According to the court, the common law 
defense was inapplicable, even though the work was conducted at a 
university for research purposes, because the ultimate intent was 
commercial.22 Indeed, Judge Randall Rader would have gone further. In 
a concurring opinion, he suggested “the Patent Act leaves no room for 
any de minimis or experimental use excuses for infringement.”23 
Madey v. Duke University provided the court with the opportunity 
to bring the law closer to Judge Rader’s vision.24 In that case, Duke 
University was using patented laser technology in its teaching and 
research laboratories.25 Duke did not have a license from the patentee 
because (like all nonprofit universities) it thought pure academic 
research and teaching to be quintessential examples of “philosophical” 
experimentation.26 The Federal Circuit disagreed. It rejected the 
curiosity/profit distinction that had driven previous case law and instead 
looked to whether the conduct at issue was “in keeping with the alleged 
infringer’s legitimate business, regardless of commercial 
implications.”27 Since Duke’s objectives in using the laser—education 
35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282). 
19. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2017). 
20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2017). 
21. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1352 (Rader, J., concurring).
24. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 1362. 
27. Id.
5
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and enlightenment—increased the university’s status and attracted 
lucrative research grants, as well as great students and a distinguished 
faculty, the court concluded that its acts could not “qualify for the very 
narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.”28 
Embrex and Madey concerned the common law defense developed 
by Justice Story.29  The third case, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck 
KGaA, interpreted the Hatch Waxman Act’s statutory defense. 30 In this 
case, the patent covered a compound that promoted the healing of 
wounds.31 Suspecting that the compound might also halt tumor growth, 
the defendant conducted its research without authorization, reasoning 
that if the work panned out, it would submit its data for regulatory 
approval of what would be a new treatment for cancer.32 In a suit 
brought by the patent holder, the Federal Circuit found the activity 
infringing.33 Just as it had narrowed the common law defense, the court, 
per Judge Rader, stressed congressional use of the term “solely” and 
held that the Hatch Waxman Act defense applied only to clinical testing 
(that is, patient testing) of pharmaceuticals already on the market. In 
other words, Judge Rader confined the exemption to the situation present 
in Bolar.34 
Significantly, Judge Pauline Newman dissented in part.35 She was 
not on the panels in Embrex or Madey, so she used her participation in 
Integra to challenge the Federal Circuit’s growing hostility to 
experimentation.36 In her view, 
[t]he purpose of a patent system is not only to provide a financial
incentive to create new knowledge and bring it to public benefit
through new products; it also serves to add to the body of published
scientific/technologic knowledge. The requirement of disclosure of the
details of patented inventions facilitates further knowledge and
understanding of what was done by the patentee, and may lead to
further technologic advance. The right to conduct research to achieve
such knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of the
patent. That is not the law, and it would be a practice impossible to
28. Id. 
29. See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 307 F.3d 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2002). 
30. Integra Lifesciences I, LTD. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 864-65 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
vacated, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, LTD., 545 U.S. 193, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
31. Integra Lifesciences I, LTD., at 862-63. 
32. Id. at 863. 
33. Id. at 872. 
34. Id. at 866-68. 
35. Id. at 872. 
36. Id. at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting in part). 
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administer. Yet today the court disapproves and essentially eliminates 
the common law research exemption. This change of law is ill-suited 
to today’s research-founded, technology-based economy.37 
Thus, according to Judge Newman, the court should have determined 
that the defendant’s research did not infringe on the plaintiff’s patent. 
Judge Newman’s position found considerable support in the 
broader research community and among legal scholars. For example, in 
a report that heavily influenced the contours of patent reform, A Patent 
System for the 21st Century, the National Academies of Science 
Committee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge Based 
Economy questioned the result in Madey.38 While the Report 
acknowledged that a study funded by the National Academies on 
academic research showed that among academics there was “widespread 
indifference to the existence of patents” on research inputs,39 the 
Committee nonetheless argued that there were several worrisome trends. 
These trends included an increase in demand letters, an expansion in 
patenting research tools, and a rise in reliance on exclusive licenses.40 
The Committee reviewed several scholarly papers and proposed a 
research exemption, called for further consideration of the issue, and 
suggested that funding agencies condition financial support on 
agreements that researchers make their discoveries available to other 
researchers.41 The Committee on Intellectual Property Rights on 
Genomic and Protein Research and Innovation, also organized under the 
auspices of the National Academies, reiterated these concerns in a 
subsequent study.42 Significantly, it did so despite a second National 
37. Id.
38. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 108-
12 (Stephen A. Merrill et al., 2004). 
39. See John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents
and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 
292-93 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill 2003).  See also John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora, &
Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003).
40. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., supra note 38, at 109-10. See also, PATENTS IN
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, supra note 39.  
41.  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., supra note 38 at 110-17, citing Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1017 (1989); see Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (2000); see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting 
Genetic Material: A Counter-Proposal to Richard Epstein’s Steady Course, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (F. Scott Kieff 2003); see Katherine J. Strandburg,
What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81 
(2004).  See also Dreyfuss, supra note 2.
42. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND
PROTEOMIC RESEARCH (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza, 2006) [hereinafter REAPING THE 
7
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Academies-sponsored study (by a team that included the same 
researchers as the earlier study) showing that scientists ignore patents.43 
Other voices expressed similar views. The American Intellectual 
Property Law Association (AIPLA), a group heavily composed of patent 
holders, endorsed an experimental use defense, arguing that the failure to 
include “a definitive provision in the patent law exempting 
experimentation can create many potential adverse consequences, 
including threatened patent litigation, complicated licensing 
negotiations, efforts to secure compensation based upon the fruits of any 
experimentation (including ‘reach-through’ royalties), royalty stacking, 
and delays in starting experiments until patent issues can be resolved.”44 
At around the same time, several scholars came out in favor of an 
experimental use defense and made specific suggestions for crafting 
such a measure.45 
Despite this support, a legislative fix to the research problem was 
not included in the bills that culminated in the AIA. There were several 
reasons. First, as with the National Academies studies, other follow-ups 
were interpreted as failing to show a significant problem developing in 
the research arena.46 Scientists were ignoring patents, and patentees were 
ignoring scientists—perhaps because the patentees thought that any 
advance the scientists discovered would lead to new downstream 
products that would be covered by their patents. Second, various self-
help measures were developed to supplement the proclivities of 
scientists. These included guidelines issued by the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) and the Association of University Technology Managers 
BENEFITS]. 
43. See John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, Patents, Material Transfers and
Access to Research Inputs in Biomedical Research, in FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMY 
OF SCIENCES’ COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEIN-
RELATED INVENTIONS (2005), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.531.1401&rep=rep1&type=pdf; John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho, & Wesley M. 
Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002 (2005). 
44. AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF AIPLA SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL’S REPORT ON REAPING THE BENEFITS 
OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH 29 (2006), available at http://www.aipla.org/
advocacy/executive/Documents/NAS092304.pdf.  
45. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 
supra note 40; see Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use 
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); 
Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United 
States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use 
Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1650-51 (2001). 
46. Claude Barfield & John E. Calfee, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PATENT SYSTEM: 
BALANCING INNOVATION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 40-43 (AEI Press, 2007). 
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(AUTM), which encouraged research institutions to adopt nonexclusive 
licensing practices and to reserve the rights of academic researchers to 
use patented inputs without authorization.47 
Third, and perhaps most important, the biotechnology community 
saw an experimental use defense as a threat to its business model. At the 
time, most biomedical research was intensely upstream—the discoveries 
concerned basic information on living organisms, including genetic 
sequences, metabolic pathways, regulatory mechanisms, and methods 
for manipulating these discoveries. While consumer benefits were in the 
offing, at the time of the debate over patent reform, the commercial 
significance of these advances was largely as research inputs. Thus, 
unlike the firms represented by AIPLA, which principally held patents 
on consumer end-use products such as small-molecule medicines (and 
wanted the freedom to experiment in order to bring these products to 
market), the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO) was 
concerned that a research exemption, if too broadly drafted or too 
generously interpreted, would interfere with the ability of its members to 
license their innovations and thereby jeopardize their ability to fund 
future research. After all, if the core use of a technology is in research, 
then a research exemption would obviate the need for anyone to pay 
tribute to the inventor.48 With so many other controversial issues on the 
reform agenda, proponents of the AIA chose to delete a proposal on 
experimental use rather than to fight BIO. 
B. The Backlash
Even before the AIA was enacted, it became increasingly clear that
the decision to shrink the ambit of the experimental use defense would 
create difficulties for the innovation environment. To start, there is a 
profound normative question as to whether a legal regime can be said to 
be running smoothly if it functions satisfactorily only because important 
participants ignore the rule of law. The legal system requires many 
things of the scientific community: adherence to environmental 
47. Id. at 54; In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in Licensing University
Technology, ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS (March 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.autm.net/advocacy-topics/government-issues/principles-and-guidelines/nine-points-to-
consider-when-licensing-university/. 
48. See Barfield & Calfee, supra note 46, at 61-63; The Patent Reform Act of 2007 - 
Coalition Letter, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORGANIZATION (BIO) (Oct. 23, 2007), available at 
https://www.bio.org/advocacy/letters/patent-reform-act-2007-coalition-letter (warning about 
weakening the enforceability of validly issued patents); John Raidt, PATENTS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 
32 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation 2014), available at 
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/article/foundation/RaidtPaper.pdf.  
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standards, fidelity to civil rights laws, and observance of pedagogical 
responsibilities to students. Relying on scientists to ignore patents 
arguably encourages the flouting of these other important legal standards 
and social norms. Moreover, such a regime can have an adverse impact 
on the careers of risk averse (which is to say, law- abiding) scientists. 
Equally as important, a closer look at the studies the National 
Academies commissioned showed that they did not fully support the 
notion that the availability of a research exemption was irrelevant. While 
the official take-away was that scientists ignore patents, the studies had 
also noted that material transfer agreements (MTAs) were delaying 
research.49 While MTAs can be viewed as an alternative mechanism for 
retaining exclusive rights over research (meaning that the problems 
researchers faced were not about patenting), the difficulty in concluding 
MTAs was arguably caused by difficulties in allocating patent rights 
over the fruits of the work that would be accomplished with the patented 
inputs. Besides, the National Academies studies both consisted of 
surveys of scientists who, in many cases, were the heads of research 
labs. Their subjective beliefs as to whether patents were inhibiting their 
research may have suffered from cognitive deficiencies. Research 
directors are not always aware of delays at the lab bench. In some cases, 
they may know there was delay but may attribute it to the wrong cause, 
such as lazy postdocs. In addition, they may have subconsciously altered 
their research agendas in order to stay away from areas where patents 
were prevalent or known to be enforced vigorously. 
Studies relating the quantity of research to more objective factors 
soon appeared, including two papers by Fiona Murray that pointed in the 
opposite direction from the National Academies studies. In the first, 
Murray exploited the fact that prior to 1999, patent applications were 
confidential until the patent issued (leaving a period of two or more 
years before the existence of the patent was knowable). She compared 
papers in Nature Biotechnology that had a patent pair (that is, a patent 
issued on the research results) to see how often these papers were cited 
in the time period before the patent issued compared to the citation rate 
after issuance. She then compared that result with the ratio of citation 
rates for papers that were published at the same time, but which were not 
associated with patents. She found that citation rates fell faster for papers 
with a corresponding patent than for the others, suggesting that research 
decreases once a patent is issued.50 In the second study, she compared 
49. See Barfield & Calfee, supra note 46, at 40 n.4 (which appears on p. 96). 
50. Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free
10
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the citation rates of patented oncomice (mice bred to contract cancer) 
during the time when the patent holder charged a monopoly price for the 
mice with citation rates after the patent holder dropped the price to 
competitive levels. Much more research—and more varied research—
was published once the mice were easily accessible.51 
Anecdotal evidence of patent problems also accumulated, 
especially around genetic inventions. Most prominently, Myriad 
Genetics, the holder of patents on BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 gene sequences, 
which mutate in ways that are associated with early onset breast cancer, 
developed a diagnostic test that it refused to license to other laboratories. 
As a result, only Myriad could test patients: second-opinion testing 
became unavailable, patients whose insurance companies did not deal 
with Myriad could not obtain reimbursement for the tests, and there was 
no non-infringing way to test Myriad’s work for accuracy or to see 
whether Myriad was staying abreast of new scientific developments.52 
Most alarmingly, researchers looking for other causes of early onset 
breast cancer could not use the test to exclude patients whose condition 
was attributable to BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 mutations.53 Frustrations 
regarding discrepancies between patient histories and Myriad reports led 
to a storm of protest within the genetics community, a comprehensive 
study of the genetics sector which demonstrated other social problems 
caused or exacerbated by exclusive patents rights over genetic tests,54 
and ultimately, a 2010 report by a committee organized by the 
Department of Health and Human Services recommending a research 
Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON. 
BEHAVIOR & ORG. 648, 664-69 (2007). 
51. See Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona Murray, Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-Run 
Supply of Public Knowledge: Evidence from Human Genetics, 52 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT J. 
1193 (2009).  See also Heidi Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from 
the Human Genome, 121 J. POL. ECON. 1, 24 (2013) (showing that more work was done on genes in 
a public data base than on genes kept as trade secrets). 
52. See generally, E. Richard Gold & Julia Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the
Policy Storm, 12 (4 SUPP.) GENET. MED. S39 (2010).  
53. See Declaration of David H. Ledbetter, Appendix at 1505, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. UPTO, 09 Civ. 4515 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing the situation at Emory), available at 
http://www.pubpat.org/assets/files/brca/CAFC/Appendix/A968%20to%20A3073%20Part%203%20
of%207.pdf & Declaration of Ellen T. Matloff, id. at 3020 (describing situation at Yale).
54. Robert Cook-Deegan & Christopher Heaney, Gene Patents and Licensing: Case Studies
Prepared for the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, 12 (4 SUPPL.) 
GENET MED. S-1 (2011). See also Robert Cook-Deegan, John M. Conley, James P. Evans & Daniel 
Vorhaus, The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUROPEAN 
J. HUMAN GENETICS 585 (2013) (revealing Myriad’s unwillingness to deposit the mutations it
discovered into publicly-accessible data bases). 
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exemption for those who use patented genes for research purposes.55 
By 2005, the Supreme Court had also entered the fray. In a 
unanimous opinion citing Judge Newman’s dissent in Integra, the Court 
held that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the Hatch Waxman Act’s 
statutory exemption was too stingy.56 Reversing the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Integra, Justice Scalia focused on the language of the statute 
and emphasized that research had to be only “reasonably” related to the 
submission of information for premarket clearance to merit use of the 
exemption.57 Thus, he reasoned, preclinical studies for the purpose of 
finding other medical uses for a patented composition were 
permissible.58 But even though much of the Court’s opinion showed an 
appreciation for scientific research, the decision did not go very far in 
creating space for experimentation. Thus, the Court cautioned that 
[b]asic scientific research on a particular compound, performed
without the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief
that the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the
researcher intends to induce, is surely not ‘reasonably related to the
development and submission of information’ to the FDA.59
Even more obviously, research in areas unrelated to pharmaceuticals 
could not rely on the Hatch Waxman defense because there was no need 
to submit such data “under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .”60 
Still, the problem of fundamental research clearly bothered the 
Court. In a 2006 dissent from the dismissal of certiorari in a case about 
medical diagnostics, Justice Breyer declared that “sometimes too much 
patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts,’ the constitutional objective of patent and 
copyright protection.”61 In four subsequent cases, the Court sharply 
reduced the ambit of protection for fundamental life sciences research 
55. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING
PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS: REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY 97 (2010), available at 
http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf. 
56. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. (the “exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to the development and submission of any [regulatory] information”). 
59. Id. at 205-06. 
60. Id. at 195. 
61. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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and for abstract inventions.62 Specifically, in Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Labs., the Supreme Court held that the 
correlation between the dosage level of a drug and the blood level of a 
metabolite of the drug is an unpatentable law of nature.63 In Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., it invalidated Myriad’s 
claims to the BRCA 1 and 2 sequences on the ground that genomic DNA 
(gDNA) is a phenomenon of nature. In so holding, the Court noted that 
“without this exception, there would be considerable danger that the 
grant of patents would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit 
future innovation premised upon them.’”64 Along the way, in KSR Int’l 
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court also raised the inventive step, 
thus making it more difficult to show that an invention is nonobvious 
enough to merit patent protection.65 Moreover, the Court made it 
difficult to escape Mayo’s bar on patenting laws of nature by adding a 
treatment step. In Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., the 
Court stressed that infringement requires one entity to perform every 
step of the patent claim. 66 For diagnostic inventions this is a problem 
because an advanced diagnostic such as gene testing is rarely performed 
by the person who treats the patient. 
The consequences for the life sciences are acute. DNA sequences 
are no longer patentable and, presumably, neither are other naturally 
occurring materials such as proteins, RNA, hormones, enzymes, or 
vitamins, all of which may have therapeutic significance and which may 
be expensive to test for regulatory approval and to commercialize. Basic 
diagnostics are also unprotectable. The poster child for the change is 
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,67 which involved a way to 
detect genetic defects in a fetus by examining paternally-inherited fetal 
DNA isolated from the mother’s blood.68 The developers were the first 
to realize that paternal DNA was available for testing, but their patent 
was held invalid for several reasons: the DNA is not patentable under 
Myriad; while the inventors had to isolate the DNA and make enough of 
it to analyze, these are standard techniques and not inventive enough per 
62. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297
(2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) (both 
in the life sciences) and Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609-10 (2010); Alice v. CLS Bank Int’l, 
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2361 (2014) (computerized business methods).  
63. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1297. 
64. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (internal citation omitted). 
65. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). 
66. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2117. 
67. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
68. Id. at 1373. 
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KSR; and, as the Federal Circuit held, the relationship between paternal 
DNA and the characteristics of the fetus is a law of nature, and therefore 
runs afoul of Mayo.69 Despite this ruling, the method is revolutionary: 
for a range of potential defects, it substitutes a simple blood test for 
amniocentesis, thereby obviating the risk of miscarriage that is inherent 
in sampling amniotic fluid.70 Although the scientific community as a 
whole questioned the outcome—twenty-two amicus curiae briefs 
supported a petition for review—the Supreme Court denied certiorari.71 
II. REPERCUSSIONS
There is irony here. The biotechnology community was opposed to 
a research defense because it was concerned that the defense would 
jeopardize the revenue stream from its research tools. What it has now is 
a patent system that jeopardizes the revenue stream from many of its key 
innovations: therapeutics based on naturally occurring compounds, 
diagnostics to determine a patient’s condition or to decide on therapeutic 
sufficiency, as well as so-called companion diagnostics (“personalized 
medicine”)—methods for testing whether a patient will respond to a 
particular therapy.72 In the run up to the AIA, BIO wanted to leave well 
enough alone. Instead, it must now deal with the worst of all possible 
worlds. It must cope with a system that sharply reduces incentives to 
innovate in an arena where the cost of getting to market can be 
extremely high,73 yet the law does nothing to fix the research problem 
created by the patents that do issue. There is also irony in terms of what 
the Court sought to accomplish. Justice Breyer’s call was to promote the 
progress of science; he apparently assumed that without patents, 
fundamental advances will become freely available for the use of all 
researchers. In fact, however, firms in the life sciences industries may 
69. Id. at 1373-74. 
70. Id. at 1379. 
71. Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016); for a list of amici,
see Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/sequenom-inc-v-ariosa-diagnostics-inc/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017). 
72. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 J. SCI. & TECH. 246 (2015). 
73. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Jacob S. Sherkow, The Changing Life Sciences Patent
Landscape, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 292 (2016); Damian Garde, The Supreme Court’s 
Decision That’s Shaking Up Biotech, STAT (June 27, 2016), available at 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/06/27/supreme-court-biotech-patents/. See also Joseph A. DiMasia, 
Henry G. Grabowskibi & Ronald W. Hans, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New 
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20 (2016), available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629616000291 (finding that the lifecycle 
cost per approved drug is close to $3 billion). 
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change their focus to inventions that can be kept as trade secrets,74 yet 
secrecy may be more inhibiting of scientific growth than patents. 
Alternatively, the industry may demand other sorts of incentives, such as 
tax preferences and prizes, which may not be forthcoming and may 
create inefficiencies or impose new forms of control over research 
agendas.75 
To make matters even worse, firms in other countries operate in a 
diametrically opposite legal environment: patents are generally available 
on biotechnological inventions, but there is a set of doctrines that 
protects research and the broader public interest.76 The situation in the 
EU furnishes an example. The law on patentability in all EU countries is 
established by the European Patent Convention (EPC),77 which has no 
equivalent to the exclusions for natural products and laws of nature that 
the Supreme Court found in § 101. Instead, the EPC declares that 
inventions in all fields of technology are patentable, provided they are 
susceptible to industrial application.78 To be sure, the Convention then 
goes on to exclude discoveries, scientific theories, and mathematical 
methods,79 as well as inventions the commercial exploitation of which 
would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality, methods for treating the 
human body, and diagnostic methods practiced on the human body.80 
While these exemptions could be read to exclude patents in the life 
sciences arena, the EU enacted a Biotechnology Directive81 to clarify 
their availability. The Directive states that advances are patentable “even 
if they concern a product consisting of or containing biological material 
74. There are some indications that Myriad is doing just that. See Robert Cook-Deegan, John
M. Conley, James P. Evans & Daniel Vorhaus, The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical
Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUROPEAN J. HUMAN GENETICS 585 (2013).
75. See generally, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent
Innovation Incentives, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1115 (2015). 
76. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Institute of Professional Representatives before the European 
Patent Office in Support of Neither Party at 3; Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. 
Ct. 2511 (2016), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/15-1182-ac-
Institute-of-Professional-Representatives-Before-the-EuropeFalsepdf (noting that the Ariosa 
decision has “world-wide implications, repeatedly conflict[s] with internationally accepted 
standards of patent-eligibility . . . and jeopardize[s] research investment in medicine and other life 
sciences”). 
77. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5,
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (entered into force Oct. 7, 1977), as amended by the Act revising the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents of Nov. 29, 2000 (entered into force Dec. 13, 2007), 
its Implementing Regulations, Protocols, and Rules Relating to Fees [hereinafter EPC].  
78. Id. at art. 52(1). 
79. Id. at art. 52(2)(a). 
80. Id. at art. 53(a) & (c).
81. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
legal protection of biotechnological inventions. 
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or a process by means of which biological material is produced, 
processed or used.”82 In particular, “[b]iological material which is 
isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a 
technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it previously 
occurred in nature.”83 Similarly, diagnostic methods that are not 
practiced on the body—including genetic diagnostics of the type at issue 
in Mayo, Myriad, and Ariosa—are patentable.84 
Although EU patents can cover advances the U.S. Supreme Court 
would regard as patent-ineligible natural laws or phenomena of nature, 
these patents do not inhibit innovation within the EU. On the whole, 
national laws determine the scope of infringement liability, and every 
EU country recognizes a robust exemption for research. For example, 
the German Patent Act states that the effects of a patent do not extend to 
“acts done for experimental purposes related to the subject matter of the 
patented invention.”85 Commonly considered to distinguish between 
research on the patented invention, which is permissible, and research 
with the patented invention, which is not, this provision would protect 
researchers such as those involved in the Integra and Embrex cases, as 
well as those who study how genetic sequences affect health or use the 
patented invention to verify the accuracy of existing testing 
procedures.86 Germany also has another provision to exempt research 
necessary to meet premarket clearance requirements.87  Thus, research of 
the sort conducted in Bolar would also be entitled to protection. 
Significantly, however, neither of these provisions would cover the 
situations that BIO was concerned with during the run up to the AIA. 
Experiments with a patented input—use of an invention that is a research 
tool for the purpose of conducting research—do not fall within the scope 
82. Id. at art 3(1). 
83. Id. at art. 3(2). That said, there are exclusions for, among other things, the human body,
art. 5(1), processes for cloning human beings, and uses of human embryos for industrial or 
commercial purposes, art. 6(2)(a) & (c). 
84. See, e.g., Geertrui Van Overwalle, Policy Levers Tailoring Patent Law to Biotechnology:
Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 435, 455 (2011). 
85. See, e.g., § 11 No. 2, German Patent Act. See also § 60 U.K. Patent Act; Japanese Patent
Law of 1959, as amended through May 6, 1998, effective June 1, 1998, § 69(1).  See generally, 
Hans-Rainer Jaenichen & Johann Pitz, Research Exemption/Experimental Use in the European 
Union: Patents Do Not Block the Progress of Science, COLD SPRING HARBOR PERSPECTIVES IN
MEDICINE (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, Nov. 6, 2014), available at 
http://perspectivesinmedicine.cshlp.org/content/5/2/a020941.full?sid=8eeea22f-8ab0-4a44-84a9-
ff20baa08523; Van Overwalle, supra note 84, at 490-91 (describing Belgian law). 
86. See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp.,  216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
87. § 11 No. 2b German Patent Act. See also § 60(5)(i) UK Patent Act. See generally Hans-
Rainer Jaenichen & Johann Pitz, supra note 85, at 6-7.  
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of either provision.88 The same situation will apply if, as planned, 
participating countries in the EU adopt a unitary patent. Under the 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, patent rights do not extend to acts 
done privately and for non-commercial purposes, to acts done for 
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented 
invention, or to research necessary to generate data to clear 
pharmaceuticals for marketing.89 
There are also other safeguards in Europe to protect the public 
interest. Some European countries have taken the position that gene 
product patents cover only the function disclosed in the patent.90 Thus, 
researchers are free to investigate patented genes for other functions and 
uses. The Court of Justice of the European Union has further limited the 
ambit of gene patents by holding that the patent on a gene is infringed 
only when the gene is performing its biological function.91 In addition, 
unlike U.S. antitrust law, which permits a party with an exclusive 
position to refuse to deal with potential licensees,92 European 
competition law requires licensing when the refusal to deal would block 
the appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer 
demand, when the refusal to license would eliminate all competition, and 
when the refusal lacks business justification.93 Thus, Myriad’s 
unwillingness to license laboratories to offer second opinions would 
raise a question under European competition law (or it would create 
enough of a concern to induce the right holder to license). Finally, 
several EU countries’ patent laws include the possibility of awarding 
compulsory licenses when patent holders interpose unreasonable 
obstacles to access.94 
The bottom line is that in the EU, patents are available to motivate 
88. Hans-Rainer Jaenichen & Johann Pitz, supra note 85, at 4. 
89. AGREEMENT ON A UNIFIED PATENT COURT, art. 27 (a), (b) & (d), available at 
https://www.unified-patent-court.org/sites/default/files/upc-agreement.pdf [hereinafter UPC 
Agreement].  
90. Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über den rechtlichen Schutz biotechnologischer
Erfindungen [Statute Implementing the European Council’s Biotechnology Directive], Jan. 21, 
2005, BGBL I at 146, § 1a (4) (Ger.); CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE art. L613-2-1 (Fr.). 
91. Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 E.C.R. 7. 
92. Verizon Comm’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08 
(2004). 
93. Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v. Commission of the
European Communities (Magill), 1995 ECR I-743 (Court of Justice Apr 6, 1995) (joining Cases C-
241/91P and C-242/91P). 
94. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977 c 37, § 48A(1)(b)(i) (Eng); 2 J.W. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT
LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02, 2001). See also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Implications of the DNA 
Patenting Dispute: A U.S. Response to Dianne Nicol, 22 J. L. INFO. & SCI. 1 (2013). 
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research at the cutting edge of life sciences research, including work 
required to isolate naturally occurring substances and find their 
therapeutic value or to work that correlates genomic and phenomic 
characteristics and contributes to the development of personalized 
medicine. At the same time, the public’s interest is protected through 
exemptions. To put this another way, many countries have created an 
atmosphere that, as compared to the United States, is much more 
conducive to research. Americans can certainly benefit from the work 
accomplished in these other countries. For example, because research 
data can be imported back into the United States even when produced 
using methods patented in the United States, the drug approval process 
would not change if life sciences research mainly took place abroad.95  
However, the advantageous legal climate in other countries could easily 
lead to research arbitrage, a decrease in research institutions and 
research jobs in the United States, a brain drain, and eventually the loss 
of U.S. technological dominance.96 
At one time, the notion that innovation would move abroad may 
have seemed a rather remote possibility. After all, the U.S. government 
provides outstanding support for research and U.S. lab facilities and 
research personnel have long been viewed as the best in the world. It is 
not, however, a sure thing that these advantages will continue. As other 
countries have become aware of the importance of technological 
innovation to the economy, other governments have begun to nurture 
and support the research enterprise. A 2015 study of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is illuminating.97 It 
demonstrates that Asia and the EU are devoting increasing attention to 
technological research and that the research and development (R&D) 
95. See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (interpreting 35
U.S.C. § 271(g)). 
96. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can
Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 223 (2004). Cf. Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for 
Abolition of Section 101 of the Patent Act, LAW 360 (April 12, 2016), available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/783604/kappos-calls-for-abolition-of-section-101-of-patent-act 
(noting that Kappos, a former Director of the Patent and Trademark Office, “has begun telling 
clients that patent protection for biotechnology and software inventions is more robust in other 
countries like China and Europe and they are better off seeking patents in those places, because of 
the way U.S. courts have interpreted Section 101”). 
97. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD SCIENCE 
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expenditures of foreign companies are also on the rise.98 This has 
translated into an increase in scientific publications, particularly in 
China,99 which, in 2014, was also the leader in patent activity. Indeed, its 
intellectual property office is receiving more applications than those in 
the United States and Japan combined.100 Significantly, the OECD study 
also shows that international collaborations, as well as citations across 
economies, are growing,101 which suggests that scientists themselves 
recognize that excellence in science is no longer concentrated in one 
country. Researchers have also become more mobile. Where the United 
States once experienced a net influx of scientists, the flow has changed 
direction, as scientists now migrate to the places they view as offering 
the best opportunities.102 In a few technologies, the U.S. has already lost 
its dominant position.103 
III. PROPOSALS
I am not alone in seeing the connections among the uncertainties 
generated by § 101 jurisprudence, the concerns about investment in 
innovation, and the ability to conduct research. The U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office has convened two roundtables on subject-matter 
eligibility and heard from a variety of individuals and institutions about 
the need to change the law on which inventions are considered 
patentable.104 Tellingly, a statement filed by a group of twenty-two legal 
practitioners and scholars linked the need to revise § 101 with the 
experimental use defense, noting that clarification of the right to 
experiment would “assure that no vestige remains of the Supreme 
Court’s justification for imposing a judicial eligibility exception.”105 The 
so-called Banbury Statement suggested legislatively overruling the 
98. Id. at 15-16, 38, 57-60. See also id. at 97-100 (showing levels of support for higher
education and educational institutions, where research is performed, in the United States and 
elsewhere). 
99. Id. at 61. 
100. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INDICATORS 23 (2015), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/
en/wipo_pub_941_2015.pdf.  
101. OECD Scoreboard, supra note 97, at 66-67. 
102. Id. at 68, 128-29. 
103. Id. at 76, 78-79. 
104. See Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/comments-public/patent-subject-matter-
eligibility-roundtable-2 (last updated Feb. 16, 2017). 
105. BANBURY CENTER, COLD SPRING HARBOR LABORATORY, A PROPOSED PATH FORWARD 
FOR LEGISLATIVELY ADDRESSING PATENT ELIGIBILITY LAW (2016), available at 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Banbury%20Statement.pdf.  
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recent § 101 decisions, a revision to § 101 that would limit patents to 
“inventions contributing to the technological arts,” and an exemption 
“targeted in a manner that is consistent with the 2006 recommendation 
of the National Academies.”106 
As always, the devil is in the details. I leave it to others to consider 
the revision of § 101 (and to expound on what technological arts might 
mean107); here, I concentrate on the experimental use exemption. As 
noted earlier, in the lead up to the AIA, several scholars proposed 
research defenses. For example, Rebecca Eisenberg would have allowed 
researchers to use patented materials without authorization, but in certain 
types of cases, would have charged a “reasonable royalty” after the 
invention was developed in order to compensate for the patent holder’s 
initial investment.108 Janice Mueller’s idea was to create a reach-through 
royalty based on the contribution the patented input made to the products 
the researcher developed.109 Maureen O’Rourke suggested the adoption 
of a patent analogue to copyright’s four-factor fair use defense,110 but 
would have suggested five factors and, unlike in copyright, would have 
allowed the court to levy a royalty in some cases.111 Because the actual 
payments under all these proposals would have been difficult to 
calculate and, in most cases, the calculation would occur long after the 
infringement, it was not certain that any of them would be effective in 
enticing researchers to make full use of patented inputs. 
In my earlier work, I took a somewhat different tack and suggested 
that bona fide researchers (as determined by their institutional 
affiliation) be required to seek authorization from the patentee. 
However, if the patent holder refused to license, the researcher could 
then use the technology without permission. There was, however a 
catch: researchers who used patented material without authorization 
would be required to commit to publishing the resulting research and 
either put the advances made into the public domain or patent them 
under the understanding that they would be licensed out on a 
nonexclusive basis and on reasonable terms.112 My thinking was that the 
106. Id. at 1. 
107. See, e.g., David J. Kappos, John R. Thomas & Randall J. Bluestone, A Technological
Contribution Requirement for Patentable Subject Matter: Supreme Court Precedent and Policy, 6 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 152 (2008). 
108. Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1078. 
109. Mueller, supra note 45, at 58. 
110. O’Rourke, supra note 41, at 1208-09; 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
111. Id.
112. Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 471. See also Richard R. Nelson, The Market Economy and the 
Scientific Commons, 33 RES. POL’Y 467 (2004) (endorsing this proposal). 
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identification requirement would eliminate the need to determine what 
constituted a research use. Further, this scheme would encourage 
scientists engaged in fundamental research to make their work freely 
available or available on reasonable terms, and it would obviate the need 
to engage in complex royalty calculations on downstream commercial 
products. 
However, since I made this recommendation, two things have 
happened—one that weakens it and one that somewhat strengthens it. 
On the negative side, the rise in collaborative research and institutional 
interest in patenting have made it much more difficult to identify bona 
fide basic researchers by their affiliation. The Bayh-Dole Act has turned 
academics into entrepreneurs and many of their spin-off companies (and 
the firms that acquire these spin offs) also engage in the sort of research 
that should be regarded as basic, fundamental science.113 Thus, the limit 
placed on who can benefit from the exemption no longer makes sense; 
should this proposal move forward, it would have to be expanded to all 
researchers and include a definition of “experimental.” On the positive 
side, the idea of requiring patent holders to promise to freely license on 
reasonable terms now has considerable currency, for this type of 
licensing is regularly used by standard-setting organizations to ensure 
that the patents essential to a standard are freely available to all the 
participants in an industry.114 While there are sometimes problems in 
determining what constitutes a reasonable royalty,115 reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory licensing (RAND) has been shown to be a feasible 
way of ensuring the accessibility of materials that are needed to facilitate 
interoperability (e.g. among cellphones), backward and forward 
compatibility (for things like word processing programs), and the 
prevention of products (like the betamax video system) from becoming 
stranded. There are strong commonalities between scientists researching 
the same technical problem who need the same inputs and firms 
manufacturing equipment that need technological components drawn to 
the same specifications. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the same 
solutions might be applicable to both problems. Interestingly, Ryan 
Vacca and his coauthors have suggested the use of a RAND licensing 
113. Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Tailoring Incentives: A Comment on Hemel and
Ouellette’s Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 131, 136 (2014); See also Peter Lee, 
Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 37-38 (2013). 
114. See generally, Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 IND. L.J. 231 (2014). 
115. See Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars:
Triangulating the End Game, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 35-47 (2014). 
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scheme in the seed sector, which presents another situation in which an 
input is patented, yet fundamental to an entire industry.116 
Still, a reasonable royalty is not the same as free, and as we have 
seen in other developed countries, experimental uses are free of any 
payment obligation. Katherine Strandburg has come the closest to 
proposing an equivalent resolution for the United States.117 Her idea is to 
adopt the “use on/use with” distinction and thus permit essentially the 
same unauthorized uses permitted in Europe.118 While she would tack on 
a compulsory license scheme to ensure the availability of research tools 
to conduct research,119 it is likely that such an addition would continue 
to be a deal breaker for tool manufacturers such as the members of BIO. 
But because, as Strandburg notes in another article, the tools of interest 
to fundamental researchers are often invented by other fundamental 
researchers,120 the self-help measures developed by AUTM and the NIH 
may be sufficient to ensure their availability.121 
The remaining question is whether a statute of this type would 
provide enough certainty to patent holders, researchers, or courts. 
Because the measure appears to work exceedingly well elsewhere,122 
U.S. courts could rely on foreign case law to flesh out the rudimentary 
distinction between “on” and “with.” In any event, the provision likely 
operates less as a rule of decision in infringement litigation and more as 
a norm generally agreed upon by the scientific community, or as an in 
terrorem clause that prevents right holders from denying researchers the 
right to experiment. Nonetheless, more detail may be required for an 
exemption to be politically palatable in countries like the United States, 
which is highly litigious and relies on a common law method that can 
obfuscate rather than clarify poorly specified standards. A study by the 
UK Royal Society, referring to the EU situation, found that between the 
extremes of infringement and exemption “there is doubtful ground, and 
prudent people avoid doubtful ground.”123 Thus, it concluded that it 
116. Benjamin M. Cole, Brent J. Horton & Ryan Vacca, Food for Thought: Genetically
Modified Seeds As De Facto Standard-Essential Patents, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 313, 347-53 (2014) 
(suggesting the use of RAND licenses in cases in which a farmer can show that a genetically 
modified seed has become a de facto standard).  
117. Strandburg, supra note 41, at 119-22. See also Katherine J. Strandburg, Bend or Break?
The Patent System in Crisis: Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 142-46. 
120. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79
U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008). 
121. See supra text accompanying note 46.
122. See e.g., Jaenichen & Pitz, supra note 85. 
123. THE ROYAL SOCIETY, KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN: THE EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
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would be “conducive to the development of science if the position of 
scientific work under these exemptions was clearer.”124 
AIPLA’s 2006 proposal included substantially more detail. 
Notably, this formulation was substantially accepted as a 
recommendation by the National Academies’ Committee on Intellectual 
Property Rights in Genomic and Protein Research and Innovation, and it 
was endorsed in the Banbury Statement issued in 2016. Built in part on a 
bill considered by the House of Representatives in 1990,125 the proposal, 
as reformulated by the National Academies, would expand upon the 
research on/research [with] distinction as follows: 
Making or using a patented invention should not be considered 
infringing if done to discern or discover: 
a. the validity of the patent and scope of afforded protection;
b. the features, properties or inherent characteristics or advantages of
the invention;
c. novel methods of making or using the patented invention; or
d. novel alternatives, improvements, or substitutes.
Further, making or using the invention in activities incidental to 
preparations for commercialization of a non-infringing alternative 
should also be noninfringing.126 
This exemption would permit the research in Integra, where the 
idea was to find other uses for the wound-healing medicine (subsection 
(c)); it would also cover the researcher in Embrex who was looking for 
alternative ways to inoculate chick eggs (subsection (d)). It would 
similarly immunize from liability work carried out to discover other 
PROPERTY POLICY ON THE CONDUCT OF SCIENCE, § 3.23 (2003), available at 
https://royalsociety.org/~/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2003/9845.pdf. 
124. Id.
125. The House proposal would have added 35 U.S.C. § 271(j): 
(j) It shall not be an act of infringement to make or use a patented invention solely for
research or experimentation purposes unless the patented invention has a primary
purpose of research or experimentation. If the patented invention has a primary purpose
of research or experimentation, it shall not be an act of infringement to manufacture or
use such invention to study, evaluate, or characterize such invention or to create a
product outside the scope of the patent covering such invention. This subsection does not 
apply to a patented invention to which subsection (e)(1) applies.
H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. § 402 (1990). See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
ASSOCIATION, RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT ENTITLED “A PATENT SYSTEM 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY” at 26, available at http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/executive/
Documents/NAS092304.pdf [hereinafter AIPLA RESPONSE]. 
126. REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 42, at 14; AIPLA RESPONSE, supra note 125, at 25. 
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causes of early-onset breast cancer (subsections (c) and (d)), and 
incidental uses of the patented inventions to verify the accuracy of 
Myriad’s tests for BRCA 1 and 2-related breast cancers. However, it 
would not permit the unauthorized use Duke was making of the laser at 
issue in Madey, for that is best analyzed as research use with the laser.127 
But that is a feature, not a bug: as we have seen, an exemption for 
research use of research tools is problematic because it could arguably 
undermine incentives to invent research tools. 
In short, the National Academies/AIPLA provision targets exactly 
the activities that should be beyond the scope of infringement liability 
while identifying the uses that should be subject to the patent holder’s 
authority, and it ensures that those that are within that authority will not 
be found exempt from liability. Presumably, it is this careful wording 
that allowed Hans Sauer, Deputy General Counsel of BIO, to join the 
Banbury Statement and come around to the notion that a legal regime 
that includes a robust safeguard for research offers a better environment 
for biomedical science. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States patent system is no longer well suited to the 
needs of the life sciences sector. Patents cannot be obtained in many key 
areas, including for the development of medicines that involve naturally 
occurring materials such as proteins, hormones, enzymes, or vitamins. 
More important, there is likely insufficient protection for the important 
new field of personalized medicine. While that arena does not currently 
require the extensive testing demanded of pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices, the FDA is interested in ensuring the quality of these tests, and 
thus the situation could easily change.128 The Supreme Court denied 
protection in these areas out of concern that patents would chill research 
and impair the advancement of science. In fact, however, the current 
legal climate risks the ability of the United States to fully participate in 
the Knowledge Economy and threatens its competitive position as an 
innovator. It is therefore time to consider reinstating a research 
exemption to patent liability. With such an exemption, the patent system 
127. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has hinted that a better view of Madey may be as a research
tool case, see Integra Lifesciences I, LTD. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 
vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). See also id. at 878 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
128. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, PAVING THE WAY FOR PERSONALIZED
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would be available to incentivize fundamental research and patents 
would no longer endanger the onward march of science. 
This paper focused on the research exemption. However, it also 
behooves Congress to consider the environment for research more 
generally. Refusals to deal are also exacting a toll on scientific inquiry. 
Thus, a harder look at anticompetitive conduct on the part of patent 
holders would likewise be worthwhile. Lawmakers should consider 
invigorating the patent misuse defense, restoring antitrust liability, and 
introducing law that would permit compulsory licenses in cases where 
right holders block the ability of researchers to develop new products or 
otherwise prevent such products from entering the marketplace. 
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